u*, a stationary equilibrium will be asymptotically reached in which u = u* and there is equality between the expected and actual rates of inflation. Even though a state of steady inflation is eventually achieved. it is likely to be a very high rate of inflation-much higher than the policy-makers myopically bargained for. Thus the conventional approach goes wrong in implicitly discounting future utilities infinitely heavily. ' (This is not the only amendment to the conventional approach that I shall make.)
The dynamical approach recognizes that any optimal time-path of the unemployment ratio must approach the steady-state equilibrium level, u*; perpetual maintenance of the unemployment ratio below that level (perpetual over-employment) would spell eventual hyper-inflation and ultimately barter, while perpetual maintenance of unemployment above that level (perpetual under-employment) would be wasteful of resources. The policy trade-off is not a timeless one between permanently high unemployment and permanently high inflation but a dynamic one: a more inflationary policy permits a transitory increase of the employment level in the present at the expense of a (permanently) higher inflation and higher interest rates in the future steady state. Optimal aggregate demand therefore depends upon society's time preference.
If there is no time discounting of future utilities, future considerations dominate and society should aim to achieve asymptotically the best of all possible steady states, namely the one in which the (actual and expected) inflation rate is low enough, and hence the money interest rate (the cost of holding money) is low enough, to satiate the transaction demand for liquidity by eliminating private efforts to economize on cash balances. If that steady state is not realizable immediately at the equilibrium unemployment ratio, because the initially expected rate of inflation is too high, society should accept under-employment in order to drive down the expected rate of inflation to the requisite point and thus permit an asymptotic approach to the desired steady state. If society has a positive discount rate, it will pay to trade off an ultimate shortfall of 'Of course, my criticism is founded also upon the postulated "instability" of the Phillips Curve. In fact, a situation of sustained "over-employment"-more precisely unemployment less than u* by a non-vanishing amount-has been supposed to produce an explosive spiral through its effects upon the Phillips Curve. On my assumptions, the only steady-state Phillips Curve is a vertical line intersecting the horizontal axis at u*. Now some econometric work over the past ten years might suggest that, especially on a fairly aggregative level, the Phillips Curve is a tolerably stable empirical relationship. But these studies probably estimate some average of different Phillips Curves, corresponding to different expected rates of inflation and of wage change which have varied only over a small range. Further, some writers have found the actual rate of inflation to have a weak influence on wage change and this may be explained by the view that the actual rate of inflation is a proxy, but a very poor one, for the expected rate of price or wage change. See, with reference to British data, R. G. liquidity in the futuLre steady state-to accept an ultimately higher rate of iniflation and heince a higher cost of holding money-for higher emiploynment in the present; the steady state chosen will be more inflationtary the greater the discount rate. If that ultimately desired steady state does not now obtain at equilibriuin unemployment because the iniitially expected inflation rate is too high, under-employment must still be accepted in order to drive down the expected inflation rate. But, symmietrically, if the initially expected rate of inflation is below the uiltimately tolerated rate of inflation, over-enployment is optimal to drive up the expected inflation rate. (In both cases, unemployment gradually approaches the equilibrium level as the expected inflation rate approaches the ultimately desired level.) Clearly, over-employment is more likely to be appropriate the greater is the discount rate; optimal employment in the present is an inicreasing fLunction of the discount rate. Thus optimal employmenit policy in this dynamic mi-odel depends to ail inportant extent upon time preference.' Now for the construction, defence anid analysis of the model. In this publication I confinie myself to the simplest versionl with an infinite decisioni-making horizonI, a smooth utility function and an equilibrium "utilization" ratio that is independent of the rate of inflation (as in the above discussion).
L POSSIBILITIES AND PREFERENCES
In this part the model is developed and the optimization problem stated. The solution will be discussed in Parts HI and III. A.. The "virtual" golden age, utilization and interest. To make the money rate of interest a stationary function of employment, or utilization, to make only consiumption, not investment, vary with utilization-both in order to simplify preferences-and to make the marginal productivity of labour rise at the same constant proportionate rate for every employment or utilization ratio-in order that the notion of a stationary family of Phillips Curves in terms of prices have greater plausibility-I postulate that the economy, thanks to a suitably chosen monetar.y policy and to the nature of population growth and technological progress, is unidergoinig "virtual" golden-age growth. By this I mean that actual golden-age growth wotuld be observed in the economy if the employmentlabour force ratio or utilization ratio were constant. (Golden-age growth is said to occur when all variables change exponeentially, so that investiment, consulnption and output grow at the same rate which may exceed the rate of increase of labour.)
I If the Phillips Curve shifts upward with a one point increase of the expected inflatioin rate by less than one point, then the steady-state Phillips Curve will be negatively sloped. But it will be steeper than the non-steady-state Phillips Curves wvhich is all that is required to justify a dynamical analysis and to make the discount rate important. It is true, however, that the criticism of the statical approach loses more of its force and the discount rate is less important the less steep is the steadystate curve in relation to the non-steady-state curves. A case of a negatively sloped steady-state Phillips Curve is analysed in my preliminary paper, "Optimal Employment and Inflation Over Time," op. cit.
To generate virtual golden-age growth I suppose that the homogeneous labour force (or competitive supply of labour) is homogeneous of degree one in population and homogeneous of degree zero in the real wage, disposable real income per head and real wealth per head.' Hence, whenever the latter three variables are changing equiproportionately, the labour supply will grow at the population growth rate, say y. More general assumptions are apt to impair the feasibility of golden-age growth.
As for production, let us think in terms of an aggregate productioll function which exhibits constant returns to scale in capital and employment with technical progress, if any, entering in a purely labouraugmenting way, so that output is a linear homogeneous functioln of capital and augmented employment (or employment measured in "efficiency units"). Suppose further that the proportionate rate of labour augmentation is a non-negative constant A > 0. Then augmented labour supply will grow exponentially at the "natural" rate, y + A > 0, whenever the real wage rate, disposable real income per capita and real per capita wealth grow in the same proportion.
As for capital, we require that the capital stock grow exponentially at the rate y + A. Then output will grow exponentially, as will investment and hence consumption, at the rate y + A for any constant augmented employment-capital ratio-which I shall call the utilization ratio. This implies that the government, by monetary actions I shall assume, always brings about the right level of (exponentially growing) investment necessary for exponential growth of capital at the natural rate.
On these assumptions there is virtual golden-age growth: at any constant utilization ratio, output, investment, consumption, capital, augmented employment and, under marginal productivity pricing, real profits and real wages will all grow exponentially at the natural rate, while the marginal and average product of labour and, under marginal productivity pricing, the real wage rate, real income per capita and real wealth per capita will all grow at the rate A. Disposable real income per head will also grow at rate A on plausible assumptions (e.g., a constant average propensity to consume) such that the taxes per head necessary for the exponelntial growth of consumption per head also grow at rate A. Thus the labour supply will grow at rate y, like population and employment. The marginal product of capital and the equilibrium competitive real interest rate will be constant over time. (If the augmented employment-capital ratio is changing over time, most of these variables will not be growing exponentially; it is only population, labour augmentation, capital and investment that grow exponentially, come what may.) 1 Taxes will be lump-sum. Labour supply is supposed independent of the real ancd money rates of interest. I neglect the difference between wealth and capital, i.e., the govermment debt. This is acceptable if the wealth-capital ratio is constant ovel time. While this will not occur in my model, that ratio will become asymptotic as any golden-age path is approached. I suggest therefore that the error is small enough to be neglected safely.
While the monetary authority (the Bank) is postulated to guide investment alonig its programmed path, the fiscal authority has control over consumption demand and hence, given the programmed investment demand, aggregate demand and employmeint. Since employment is the decision variable in the present problem, fiscal devices are the policy instruments by which consumption demand and thus employment are controlled. I postulate unrealistically that the Fisc levies "lump-sum" taxes (taxes having no substitution effects) on households for this purpose.
The monetary instruments by which the Bank keeps investment on its programmed path are assumed to be devices like open-market operations which operate through the rate of interest or directly upoln the demand for capital. The Bank must be alert therefore to adjust interest rates in the face of changes in aggregate demanid or utilization engineered by the Fisc. If the real interest rate equals or is closely tied to the marginal productivity of capital, then clearly the real rate of interest will be higher the greater is the utilization ratio, sinlce investment is to be kept on the exponential path appropriate to virtual golden-age growth. I Now to the details.
The real rate of interest is the money rate of interest minus the expected rate of inflation. I assume here that expectations of the current price trend are held unanimously and certainly by the public (but not necessarily by the policy-makers who, from this point of view, lead an unreal existence). If we let i denote the money rate of interest and let r denote the real rate of initerest, we obtain (1) i = r---X, O < i < ib, where x is the expected rate of algebraic deflation. Thus --x is the expected rate of inflation.2 Equation (1) says, therefore, that as x becomes algebraically small, i.e., as ilnflation becomes expected, thle money rate of interest becomes high, given the real rate of interest; for given the physical or real yield on capital, the prospects of high nominal capital gains on physical assets (and hence on equities) produced by the 1 We do usually observe that interest rates are relatively high in "good timlles", but evidently they are not sufficiently high or high soon enough to prevent procyclical variations of investment expenditures. Possibly the reason is that business fluctuations are too sharp and imperfectly foreseen to permit the monetary authorities to stabilize investment. But if fiscal weapons were used effectively to control consumption demand, as they are assumed to be in this article, then the Balnk's job of controlling investment would be much facilitated. It must be adnmitted, however, that the whole question of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in the presence of exogenous stochastic shocks and policy lags is beyond the scope of this article.
It should also be mentioned that the exclusive assignment of investment control to the monetary authority is inessential to this article. Indeed, it might be more realistic to suppose that investment was controllable in the desired manner through fiscal weapons. But then one could not identify the real rate of interest even loosely with the pre-tax marginal product of capital so there would be no simple interpretation of the shape of the r(y) function] in equation (2).
2 I know that I owe the reader an apology for inflicting this notation on him. I have chosen to work in termis of expected deflation in order to emphasize its resemblance to capital in the well-known problem o-f optinmal savinig, a problemn having some similarity to the present one. expectation of inflation will induce people to ask a high interest rate on the lending of money, while borrowers will be prepared to pay a high rate since the loan will be expected to be repaid in money of a lower purchasing power.
Since no one will lend money at a negative money rate of interest when he can hold money without physical cost, the money rate of interest must be non-negative. Further, it is assumed that there is a constant, ib, to be caled the "barter point", such that at any money interest rate equal to or in excess of it money ceases to be held so that the monetary system breaks down; this is because such a high money rate of interest imposes excessive oppertunity costs on the holding of non-interestbearing money instead of earning assets like bonds and capital.
As indicated previously, the real rate of interest will be taken to be an increasing function of the utilization ratio, denoted by y: (2) r = r(y), r(y) > 0, r' (y) > 0, r" (y) > 0, 0< L < y <j y < cx. Consider the bounds on the utilization ratio. If positive employment is required for positive output then, by virtue of diminishing marginal productivity of labour, there is some small utilization ratio, denoted by i, such that output will be only large enough to permit production of the programmed investment, leaving no employed resources for the production of consumption goods. Since negative consumption is not feasible, no value of y less than I is feasible. The value IL is a constant by implication of the previous postulates. In the other direction, there is clearly, at any time, an upper bound on (augmented) employment arising from the supply of labour function and the size of population. This explains the upper bound y which, quite plausibly in view of the previous assumptions, is taken to be a constant.
Consider now the r(y) function itself in the feasible range of the utilization ratio. The postulate that r(y) > 0 for all feasible y is perhaps not unreasonable; it could be relaxed. The curvature of r(y) is of greater importance. (The later Figure 2 gives a picture of this function.) On the view that r is equal to the marginal product of capital, one is in some difficulty, for there are innumerable production functions that make the marginal product of capital a strictly concave (increasing) function of the labour-capital ratio, e.g., the Cobb-Douglas. Fortunately, I do not really require convexity of r(y); r"(y) > 0 is overly strong for my purpose which, it will later be clear, is the concavity of U in y in (8). (Even the latter concavity could probably be dispensed with by one more expert than the present author in dynamic control theory, though probably the solutions would be somewhat affected.) I shall laterindicate the minimum requirement on r"(y). Moreover, there are countless production functions which make r" (y) > 0; for example, any production function which makes the marginal-product-of-labour curve linear or strictly convex in labour (which is not customary in textbooks) will suffice and even some concavity is consistent with (2). 
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Hence the definition of the utilization ratio used here does not imply a neo-classical model with aggregate "capital" in the background. Only neo-classical properties like diminishing marginal productivities need to be postulated and these are much more general than the neo-classical model. The previous relation shows that we could as well define the utilization ratio as the employment-population ratio (since population is growing like eYt) which, in the present model, is a linear transformation of the augmented employment-capital ratio. Thus the utilization ratio here measures not only the intensity with which the capital stock is utilized (the number of augmented men working with a unit of capital) but also the utilization of the population in productive employment.
B. Inflation, utilization and expectations. I am going to postulate that the rate of inflation depends upon the utilization ratio and upon the expected rate of inflation. In particular, the rate of inflation is an increasing, strictly convex function of the utilization ratio. When the expected rate of inflation is zero, the rate of inflation will be zero when the utilization ratio equals some constant y* between IL and j, will be positive for any greater utilization ratio and negative for any smaller utilization ratio. As y is approached, the rate of inflation approaches infinity. Finally, every increase of the expected rate of inflation by one point will increase by one point the actual rate of inflation associated with any given utilization ratio. Remembering that -x is the expected rate of inflation, one therefore may write 3P/P = f(y) (3) we see that y* can be regarded as the equilibrium utilization ratio, for at y = y* (and only there) the actual rate of inflation will equal the expected rate of inflation. Mathematically, p/p --x at y = y* sincefOA') = 0. The diagram likewise shows tha t all the points on the vertical dashed line intersecting y* are equilibrium points. Without intending normative significance, we may refer to y > y* as "over-utilization" and refer to y < y* as "under-utilization", nerely fron the point of view of equilibrium.
When there is over-utilization, the actual rate of iniflationi exceeds the expected rate, and vice versa when there is under-utilization. In either of these situations there will presuLnably be an adjtustmenit of the expected1 rate in inflation. I shall adopt the mechanis-ml of "adaptive expectations" first used in this context by Phillip Cagan.I The (algebraic) absolute time-rate of increase of the expected rate of inflation will be supposed to be an increasing function of the (algebraic) excess of the actual rate of inflation over the expected rate, being equal to zero when the latter excess equals zero. Symbolically, if ( If we let G(y) denote -aff(y)], then, by virtue of (3) and (4) we may write (5) X= G(A) p -<y <j G(y*) = O0 G'(y) < 0, G"(y) <0. Thus, when y = y*, the actual and expected inflation rates are equal so that there is no change in the expected rate of inflation. When y > y* so that the actual inflation rate exceeds the expected rate, the expected rate of inflation will be rising or, equivalently, the expected rate of deflation will be falling. The opposite results hold when y < y* Note that as y is increased, the rate at which the expected rate of inflation is increasing over time will increase with y at an increasing rate.
In order to determine the path of x over time as a function of the chosen y path, we need to know the (initial) x at time zero, x(O), which we take to be a datum:
We have to consider the admissible values of xQ in view of the upper and lower bounds on the money interest rate given in (1). First, for our analytical problem to be interesting, we require that x0 not be so algebraically small-that the initially expected inflation rate not be so great-that no feasible y decision by the Fisc can save the monetary system from breaking down in the first instant; that is, xa must be sufficiently large algebraically that i = r(y) -x0 < ib for sufficiently As for the non-negativity of the money interest rate, by analogous reasoning I should require only that x0 not be so large-that the initially expected deflation rate not be so great-that there is no y that will permit the Bank to make the real rate of interest low enough to induce the programmed volume of investment; that is, xo must be sufficiently small that i = r(y) ----x0 > 0 for sufficiently large y < j, hence that r(j) -x. > 0. But I have to confess that I do not take seriously the non-negativity constraint in my analysis. To justify this neglect I want somewhat stronger assumptions that will prevent the constraint from becoming binding when an optimal policy is followed. The constraint will not be binding initially if r(O) -x0 > 0, sinee the chosen y must be at least as great as ,. If, further, we postulate that r(p) -x(y*) > 0, where x(y*) is a "satiation" concept later defined, then the constraint will not be binding in the future either, for our solution will be seen to imply that the optimal x(t) ? max [xo, x(y*)] for all t. I believe these conditions are fairly innocuous (as well as over-strong) and that it is wise not to complicate the problem at this stage by serious consideration of the non-negativity constraint. C. Utilization, liquidity and utility. The problem of the Fisc is to choose a path y(t), t > 0, or, equivalently, a policy function, y(x, . . ) subject to (5), (6) and the information in (1), (2) Consider first the dependence of the rate of utility upon utilization for a fixed money rate of interest. That is, consider (7a). Clearly, as y is increased, there will be more output, assuming always positive marginal productivity of labour, so that, given exogenous investment, there will be more consumption. In addition, there will be a reduction of involuntary unemployment, at least in a certain range. But, on the other hand, there will also be a reduction of leisure. Further, a discrepancy between y and y* implies the failure of expectations to be realized, Th assumptions in (7) guarantee strictly diminishing marginal rate of substitutioni above iand to the left of y'. But for convexity to the right of y' we require that 9'21 not be "too negative.". Fortunately the contours are of no interest to the right of y' so we need not bother to place a lower bound on 9421.
ECONOMICA
[AUJGUSTI which suggests that people will have wished they had made different decisions.I
To make order out of this tangle of conflicting influences on the utility rate, I suggest the following view. Suppose for the moment that there were a perfect homogeneous national labour market. Then y* would be the market-clearing utilization ratio at which the gain from a little more income (or consumption) was just outweighed by the loss of leisure necessary to produce it; thus the utility peak would be at y*.
Since consumption is strictly concave in y while effort increases linearly with y, we would expect the curve to be strictly concave everywhere, i.e., dome-shaped. Moreover, as y approaches ,a, so zero consumption is approached, the rate of utility can reasonably be supposed to go to minus inifinity; similarly, as y approaches y, it is perhaps natural to suppose that the rate of utility again goes to minus infinity (although nothing in the solution hinges on this strong assumption). In such a world, what permits the Fisc to coax employment in excess of y* is the failure of people to predict the magnitude of the inflation; in this world, some real normative significance attaches to "over-utilization" . That paper deliberately neglects the steps necessary to establish the desired expected inflation rate in the particular case where, as here, no interest can be paid on money; it is entirely comparative statics, unlike the present paper. Incidentally, it is assumed there too that the lost time from economizing on inoney is "taken out" in the form of a leisure reduction rather than a labour-supply reduction (in order to facilitate diagrammatic analysis). The present paper does not assume knowledge of that paper.
to some large x, say x Y is identical of y? and i < A (full liquidity) as the diagram shows.
We need now to describe the rate of utility as a function of x and y, i.e., taking both the direct effect and the indirect effect through i, given x, of a change of y. From (2) and (7) Let us first interpret the new notation before lookiilg at the diagrams. The f-unction y(x) has already been explained; it denotes the y at which tlhe rate of utility is at a maximum with respect to y, taking into account the influence of y upon i, given x. The quantity yb, also an increasinig function of x, is that value of y which, given x, is just large enough to cause a breakdown of the monetary system by virtue of its causing i = ib through the r(y) function; of course, x may be large enough to make Yb > y in which case yb is irrelevant; it will be relevant if x is so negative that the economy is teetering on the edge of barter. The quantity x, which is an increasing function of y, is that value of x just sufficiently great, giveny, to permit full liquidity, to permit i = I; since an increase of y entails a higher r, i.e., r'(y) > 0, we shall need greater x to maintain i -the higher is y; of course, any x > x(y) is also consistent with full liquidity, as x is the minimum x consistent with full liquidity. The quantity xb, which is certainly negative even for large y, is that value of x so small algebraically that, given y, i = ib so that the monetary system breaks down; since r'(y) > 0, an increase of y causes an algebraic increase of Xb for we then need a smaller expected inflation rate to save the economy from barter. Finally, as a matter of notation, G denotes the rate of utility at equilibrium utilization and full liquidity, i.e., at y = y* and x A x(y*); C is the maximum sustainable rate of utility. Figure 3 illustrates the dependence of the utility rate on y, allowing for the interest effect of utilization, for two particular values of x: first, x = X(y*) so that there will be full liquidity at y = y* (and at smaller y); second, x = xl < x(y*), i.e., at a smaller x. I have supposed for the sake of definiteness that xl is so small-very negative-that when X = xl full liquidity is not realizable even at very small y so that the two curves never coincide; and that xb(y* peak-the static optimum-left of y? since x < x(yO) in both cases. The top curve reaches a peak to the right of y>S because at y = y* there is full liquidity, so pi = 0 (right-hand as well as left-hand derivative), while 92 > 0 because yO > y*, so that Uy[Ax(y*), y*] > 0, i.e., the curve must still be rising at y*. For purposes of illustration it was assumed that ybIx(y*)] > j so that the right-hand asymptote is y. The lower curve, corresponding to a much smaller x, has the same shape but reaches a peak, y(x,), to the left of y*. This is because, in the case illustrated (if x is very small), the marginal gain from higher utilization at y = y* < yO is not worth the concomitant increase of interest rate because the interest rate is already so high in this case. [It should be remarked that the portion of the solution (discussed later) which can be regarded as "deflationist" is not in any way dependent upon the fact that, for sufficiently small x, y(x) < y*; deflation (or at least y < y*) can be optimal even for x much higher than the aforementioned value, i.e., even when the static optimum is always above y*.] Looking at the righthand asymptote, this reflects the fact that for sufficiently small x, yb(x) < 9. I have assumed for definiteness that yb(x,) > y*, but the reverse inequality is certainly possible. Note finally, for completeness, that yb(x) approaches ,u asymptotically as x falls and approaches xb(pU). the money rate in interest is increased (at a constant rate) so the rate of utility falls-at an increasing rate by virtue of the strict concavity of q in i. As x approaches xb(y*), so that i approaches the barter point, the rate of utility goes to minus infinity. The other curve, corresponding to a smaller y, has the same shape. However, because y is smaller in this case and therefore i is smaller for every x, the critical rate Xb which drives the system into barter is algebraically smaller than in the previous case; i.e., a higher expected inflation rate is consistent with i < ib when y is smaller. Similarly, a smaller algebraic deflation rate, namely A(y1), is needed for full liquidity. Note that since Yi < y* < y?, full liquidity (i < i) in this case gives a lower rate of utility than does full liquidity in the previous case where y = y*. While it is of no significance, these considerations imply that the two curves cross: at algebraically very small x, y* > yi > Y(x) so that ye > y.' actually reduces the rate of utility in that range of x. Before (8) is utilized, some defence of it and consideration of alternatives is in order. Consider the poor German worker of the early 1920s. He was not in the market for equities so that for him the real interest rate was zero; or, rather, for him the real interest rate was only the convenience yield of holding a stock of consumer durables (cigarettes, bottled beer, etc.) which we might regard as becoming rapidly negligible as this stock is increased. It could be argued that for such people the appropriate utility-rate function is better described by U = ffb (-X,y) on the ground that the opportunity cost of holding money is simply the expected rate of inflation. If we make assumptions like 021 < 0 in the spirit of (7) we can still arrive at (8). There is little to be gained except simplicity from this approach at the cost of neglecting altogether the role of the real rate of interest for those people who participate in the capital market and who own a substantial amount of the wealth.
Another issue is my omission of the actual inflationi rate from (7). Observe that, by virtue of (3) which makes the inflation rate a function of x and y, the utility rate must ultimately depend on x and y, as in (8). We could write and still obtain some version of (8). The issue therefore revolves only around the shape of the function in (8).
I have already given full weight to the loss of utility arising from a discrepancy between the actual and expected rates of inflation. It is in large part this discrepancy that motivates opposition to inflation. It is not really inflation per se that many economists oppose but rather an unexpectedly high rate of inflation. Nevertheless it might be argued that it is of no consolation to fixed-income groups to guess correctly the current rate of inflation if they did not anticipate when they contracted their fixed money incomes the bulk of the inflation that has occurred in the intervening time! On one interpretation, this is a distributional argument: the real incomes or real wealth of widows and orphans on previously contracted fixed incomes will be eroded to socially undesirable levels by inflation.
My grounds for omitting the actual inflation rate, from this point of view, must be that the government has other means than the depressing of the utilization ratio to rectify tolerably the distribution of income.1
To the extent that appropriate redistribution efforts still leave such groups too poor, there is certainly a case for introducing the actual rate of inflation into the utility-rate function, /. But it is enormously difficult to introduce it appropriately. For if the actual and expected inflation rates should be equal for a long time then the actual rate of inflation deserves less and less weight over time; for eventually the inflation will have become a fully anticipated one. Thus an appropriate utility-rate function must be a non-stationary function. No simple possibilities satisfy me. But I wish to point out that since the optimal path in my model produces asymptotically a steady rate of algebraic inflation, hence an asymptotically anticipated inflation, and since the rate of an anticipated inflation makes no difference distributionally (apart from its liquidity effect already recognized), the asymptotic properties of the solution here are immune to criticism from this point of view.
The actual inflation rate has another influence which, it could be argued, is time-independent and hence persisting for all time. This is the nuisance cost of adjusting price lists up or down. If the rate of inflation is 20 per cent. or -20 per cent. per annum, every firm in every industry will have to revise its price lists very frequently, which again has its leisure or production costs. This suggests giving the actual rate of inflation a weak role in the utility-rate function. 0( ) can be made a dome-shaped function of ft/p. The concavity of U in y would be threatened a little-precautions would be needed to insure that Uyy < 0 everywhere-but not much of (8) would be lost. The main difference is that instead of having a U maximum in the x plane for all x > x(y) we would have a unique, non-flat peak in Figure 4 , since too high an expected rate of deflation would cause too high an actual deflation rate from the point of view of price lists. I shall mention in the next section an instance where it would be useful to introduce such a modification.2 My greatest reservations centre on the stationarity of the utility-rate function in (7). Suppose that A = 0. Due to virtual golden-age growth, aggregate consumption and leisure will be growing at rate 6, like population, at any constant utilization ratio. Since the "pie" is getting bigger over time, should not U be made to depend upon t ? Fortunately, however, per capita consumption and per capita leisure, which depend only on i and y-will be constant so that the use of a stationary utility-1 On another view the government has a moral obligation to valididate the expectations held by groups who have contracted for fixed incomes (wvhether or not they are poor), even to the extent that if inflation has occurred recently the government now owes these groups a little deflation. The government of my model treats such obligationis as "bygones", worrying only about the consequences of current deceptions, not past ones.
2This price-list consideration perhaps ought also to enter in a complicated, nonstationary way since a high, steady rate of inflation might eventually call forth institutional changes in the nature of money or perhaps even some system of " compounded prices". rate function is not wholly unreasonable. The real issue here is "discounting".
More serious difficulties arise when A > 0. Then a constant i and y imply exponenitially growing consumption per head and constant leisure per head (by virtue of the labour supply function's properties). In this case it does seem a little strange that time should not appear as an argument of the utility-rate function. But I believe that examples of underlying utility functions could be found such that time would not appear in the derived utility-rate function qp in (7).
I shall however allow the rate of utility to be "discounted" at a non-negative rate in the usual multiplicative way. No solution to our problem in its present formulation will exist if there is negative discounting.
Iln deciding which of two (x,y) paths to take-actually x(t) alone suffices to describe a path-the Fisc is postulated to compare the integrals of the possibly discounted rates of utility produced by the two paths. Hence the "social utility", W9, of a path (x,y) is given by f0 (9) W f e-8'U(x,y) dt, a > 0, where t is time, e't is the discount factor applied to the rate of utility t years hence, and 8 is the rate of utility discount. (It is understood in (9) that x = x(t), y = y(t).) The case 8 = 0 will receive special con. sideration in a moment. The optimization problem of the Fisc can now be stated as: maximize (9) subject to (5) and (6). The "optimal policy" is the function y -y(x) which gives the greatest feasible W. Given x(O) = xo, there is an optimal path x = x(t) which describes the state of the system at each time. From this information one can also derive y = y(t), since x(t) gives y(t) by (5).
In the case 8 = 0, there may be many feasible paths which cause the integral in (9) to diverge to infinity, which give infinite W; intuitively, it is unreasonable to regard all of these paths as "optimal" so that a different criterion of preferences and of optimality is wanted in this case. Such a criterion will be described briefly i-n the next section, which also gives the solution to the zero-discount case. (Nevertheless the above formulation of the mathematics of optimization is essentially correct.) The subsequent section gives the solution to the case of a positive utility discount rate.
II. OPTIMAL POLICY WHEN NO UTILITY DISCOUNTING
The optimality criterion now widely used by economists to deal with no-discount, infinite-horizon problems of this sort has been called the "'over-taking principle". A path [x1(t), y(t)] is said to be preferred or indifferent to another path [x2(), Y2(t)] if and only if one can find a time TO sufficiently large that, for all T > TO,
The former path is preferred because it eventually "overtakes" the latter path. A feasible path is said to be optimal if it is preferred or indifferent to all other feasible paths. If one then obtains a solution to the maximization problem now to be described, this solution is the optimum in this sense.1
The above optimality criterion justifies the use of a device first employed by Ramsey in his analysis of the somewhat analogous problem of optimal saving over time: choose the units in which the utility i-ate is measured in such a way that t = 0, i.e., U[$z(y*), y"'] = 0. This is merely a linear transformation of the function U that will not affect the preference orderings implied by the integral comparisons julst described. Now go ahead with the problem MWax W |U(Xv,y) dt, CJ == 0, (10) aW { subject to x= G(y),
The divergence problem cannot now arise. This is not to say, however, that an optimal policy will exist for all x,.
Readers familiar with the Ramsey problem will recognize (10) as rather like the "optimal saving" problem. There x is "capital" and y is "consumption".2 There is a zero-interest capital-saturatioln level in Ramsey that is analogous to our liquidity satiationi level, x(y); his income-the maximum consumption subject to constant capital-is analogous to our y*. His solution was the following. If initial capital is short of capital saturation, consume less than income, driving capital up to the saturation level; if initial capital exceeds the saturation level, consume more than income, driving capital down to the saturation level; if initial capital equals the capital-saturation level, stay there by consuming all capital-saturation income. Thus capital either equals for all time or approaches asymptotically and monotonically the capitalsaturation level while consumption either equals or approaches asymptotically (and monotonically) the capital-saturation level.
The solution to the problem here is similar in part. If x0 <Sx(y*) it is optimal to make y < y'* for all t, causing x to rise and approach A(y*) asymptotically, while y approaches y* asymptotically and monotonically. In other words, if the economy "inherits" an initially expected algebraic deflation rate that is insufficient for full liquidity when the utilization ratio is at its equilibrium value, then, for an optimum, the Fisc must engineer under-utilization for all time so as to cause a gradual, asymptotic movement of the expected deflation rate up to the level consistent with full liquidity and equilibirum utilizatioin; in the limit, as tim-e -See, for example, "The Ramsey Problem and the Golden Rule of Accumulationi' in E1. S. Phelps, Golden Rules of Economic Growth, New York, 1966, and the references cited there.
2 Some differences are that hiis utility rate was independent of capital; his investmeit-consumption relation, G. depended upon capital; utility was everywhere increasing in conisumnption; and GI(y) -t in is case.
increases, under-utilization vanishes and a full-liquidity equilibrium is realized. If xo = x(y*) then y = y* is optimal for all t, and therefore x = .(y") for all t. Should the economy inherit the minimuim expected deflation rate consistent with full liquidity at equilibrium, utilizatioll, then equilibrium utilization with fiull liquidity is optimal for all time. The case xo > ,(y*) will be discussed later. What will be remarkable to those steeped in the statical approach is that, when x. _ x(y*) over-utilization is not optimal whether or not
x is large enough to make y(x) > y*. Further it cain be showln that optimal y is always smaller than -even when y < y*. If we think of X = G(y) as "investmett", then (12) says that the optimal policy equates the rate of utility to investment multiplied by the (negative) marginal utility of investment, VG; this is essentially the Ramsey-Keynes rule.
From the information above on derivatives we see that V intcreases as G is increased [i.e., as y is decreased from j or yb(x), whichever is smnaller] up to G(y) whereupon V then decreases, going to minus infinity as G approaches G(,u). Only this latter decreasing region, where JVG< 0 or Uy > 0, is of relevance; in that region, VGG < 0 uianabiguously. In Figure 5 the solid curve depicts the possibly realistic case of x, great enouglh that y(xo) > y*, so that Gfy(;YO)] < 0, but niot great enough for full liquidity when y = y*, i.e., x0 < x(y*). Thus the solid utility curve, for x = xo, has a peak left of the origin but it passes under the origin, since U(.xo,y*) < S = 0. The tangency point, at (V0, Go), shows the optimal initial G(y) and hence the optimal y. Since optimal G(y) > 0 (i.e., y < y*), x will be increasinig and the V curve will therefore shift up and possibly to the left; as this process occurs, the tangency Figure 5 . The tangency point occurs at the origin so y = y* is optimal initially; this means that the equality x(t) = X&(y*) continues so that y-y* continues to be optimal for all t.
Consider now the case x0 > x(y*). Since there cannot be more than full liquidity when y = y', i.e., U(xo,y*) c U even when xo > X(y*), the tangency point continues to be at the origin. Yet the implied policy y(t) = yt, x(t)-x0 > J(y*) for all t cannot be optimal. For there is a sSsurplus" of expected deflation here; i.e., i < i when y = y*. Since V reaches a peak to the left of y", there are clearly policies of at least teemporary over-utilization (y > y*) which will permit U > U for at 1 The reader miay have noticed a second tangency point with G < 0. Pursuit of that policy would lead asymptotically to y -y* with x = ; where ;(;) = y"; since X < .xfy*), such a policy must cause W to diverge to minus infinity so that it cannot be optimal. least a while and yet allow U = C forever after; this is because x -x(y*) < x0 is sufficient for U(x,y*) -J. In other words, there is room for a "binge" of at least temporary over-utilizationl while all the time enijoying full liquidity and while never driving x below X(y*).
But it cannot be concluded that over-utilization is optimal wheni .x0 > x(y*). For no such temporary or even asymptotically vanishing binge of over-utilization can satisfy (12), which is a necessary conditioni for an optimum; in terms of Figure 5 , there is no way that such a policy can satisfy the necessary tangency condition.
Since neither y > y*, y = y* nor y< y* is optimal, the inescapable conclusion is that there exists no optimum in this case. An intuitive explanation is the following. For every binge that you specify which makes x(t) approach X(y*) (as y approaches y*), I can, by virtue of the strict concavity of the J/ curve, specify another binige that makes x approach g(y') more slowly which will be even better. There is no "best binge" (or even set of "best binges") just as there is no number closest to unity yet not equal to it. Hence there is no path preferred or indifferent to all other feasible patls.
There are at least four avenues of escape from this disconcerting situation. Let us first ask, how did Ramsey avoid it? He could avoid it (actually he never recognized it) by postulating that the net marginal product of capital became niegative beyond the capital saturation point so that there was an immediate and positive loss from having too muclh capital. (This is fair enough if capital depreciates even in storage.) In our mlodel there is nio immediate loss from having "too high" an expected deflation rate; i < i is as good as i = 1. To introduce a loss we need to suppose that U in (8) is strictly concave in x, reaching a peak and falling off thereafter. As mentioned earlier, this postulate could be justified by the price-list consideration that it is a nuisance to have to reduce prices with great frequency. (But a previous footnote indicates my uneasiness with this consideration.) Alternatively one could make assumptions leading to G,(x,y) < 0, as is done in the preliminary version of this paper.
Another avenue of escape is the introduction of a positive utility discount, as I have done in the next section. Then there will be a "best binge" so there will be an optimum for all xo (in the admissible ra'nge).
A third avenue is to employ a finite-time horizon. Then any binge inust come to an end at the end of some given number of years. There will be a "best binge" and an optimum will always exist. The unpublished version of this paper contains such a model. The fourth avenue of escape is to postulate that yO -y* so that y(x) * y* for all x and therefore the V peak cannot occur to the left of the origin. I find this unsatisfactory although some readers may not. The reader can now work out this case using a diagram like It is easy to see from (I 5), the inequality G'(y) < 0 and the observation that an optimal path would never make Uy(x,y) < 0, that Ux (x*,y*) >0. This and (8) yield the result that x* <x(y*). Thus, in the long run, there will be less than full liquidity when there is positive discounting of future utility rates. This is because the current gain from high utilization always offsets the discounted future loss due to a short fall from full liquidity. if xo < x*, so that the expected deflation rate is below its long-run optimal value, then, to drive x(t) monotonically toward x* we require y < y*, i.e., under-utilization; y(t) will approach y* only asymptotically as x(t) approaches x*. If x =x*, then y _ y* is optimal for all t. If xo > x*, then, to drive x(t) monotonically toward x'> we require y > y*, i.e., over-utilization; but, again, y(t) will approach yv asymptotically. (It does not appear that the path y(t) is necessarily monotonic but this is of little importance.)
This last result-the optimality of over-utilization in some circumstanices-is of considerable interest. The previous section laid a, possible foundation for a "deflationist" policy when the initially expected deflation rate was insufficient for full liquidity with equilibrium utilization; more precisely, under-utilization was optimal in that circum-stance so that the actual rate of inflationi resulting would be less thain the expected rate, though it need not be negative initially [or even asymptotically if X-(y*) < 0]. Moreover, an "inflationist" policy of overutilization, though it might be better than any under-utilization policy, was never optimal for there could never exist an over-utilization optimum. We see here that, when there is a positive utility discount, overutilization will be optimal when xO > x*; since x* < x(y*), this embraces the case x =--(y), i.e., the case in which there would be full liquidity at equilibrium utilization. The greater is the utility discount rate, the smaller algebraically will be the equillibrium deflation rate. Differentiation of (15) -Uxx(x*,y*)Uy(x*y*)]G'(y*) < 0, since the denominator is unambiguously negative for all xr* < X(y*), hence for 8 > 0. This indicates that, given some xo, we are more likely to find over-utilization initially optimal (x0 > x*) the larger is the utility discount rate.
Nevertheless one cannot, by choosing sufficiently large 8, make x* arbitrarily small (algebraically), not even as small as xb(y*). It is the inequality 5(x ) > y'k that lies behind the optimality of y > y* whenl Xo > x*. It can be shown that x* cannot be made larger than x(y*), where .s is defined by y(x) = y*; for as 8 goes to infinity, the derivative UY(X*,ye) in (15) goes to zero (while Ux(x*,y*) stays finite), indicating that x* approaches the value such that Uy(x,y*) = , hence approaches the value X(y*).
The value A(ye) is precisely the level of x to which the myopic, statical approach would drive x(t). That approach, which maximizes the current rate of utility at each time, leads to a policy y = y(x); under that policy, equilibrium is realized only when (asymptotically) x = x(y*) so that -(x) y'. Thus the statical approach and the case of an infinitely high discount rate lead to the same equilibrium value of x. Indeed, it can be shown that infinite utility discounting makes Uy(y,x)-0always, which mieans y = y(x), so that the statical approach and infinitely heavy discounting lead to identical policies throughout time.
But optimal behaviour in the limit as 8 goes to infinity is of little interest. Given any (finite) value of 8, the dynamic approach yields different results from the statical policy y = -x. First, since Uy(x,y) > 0 along any dynamically optimal path, the optimal y < 5 for all x. Second, and this needs emphasis, even if x0 is such that y(xo) > y*, so that myopicm maximization of the initial rate of utility would call for y > y*, the truly optimal y < y* if (and only iD xo < x*'. Thus, if the currently expected rate of inflation is 2 per cent. while the long-run equilibrium (asymptotically optimal) expected inflation rate is less, say 1 per cent., then under-utilization is optimal whether or not the current utility-rate curve peaks to the right of y*. This theme is essentially a repetition of a theme of the previous section: a dynamical approach can lead to an optimal policy that is qualitatively different from that of a myopic, statical approach. In particular, a "deflationist" policy of underutilization (and hence a rise of x over time) may be optimal even when mnyopic maximization of the current rate of utility calls for overutilization (and hence a fall of x over time).
The above results may be summarized in a qualitative way as follows. In this evenit, .y < y*' when x0 < x* as above. And if x.0 >; x*, then v = y*; hence there is no over-utilization, because there is no gaini to be had in the present (from over-utilization) that is worth a discounted future loss (from a reduction of future liquidity).
[V. CONCLUDING REMAARKS The principal theme here has been that, within the context of the above model, a tight fiscal policy producing "under-utilization", alnd hence producing an actual algebraic inflation rate that is smaller than the currently expected inflationl rate, is optimal if and only if the currently expected inflation rate exceeds the asymptotically optimal inflation rate. The latter is determined by liquidity considerations and by social time preference (the utility discount rate), not by the strength of preferences for high or low utilizatioin (at a given rate of interest). If the utility discount rate is zero, the asymptotically optimal inflation rate is simply the nmaxim-um expected inflation rate consistent with full liquidity (at equilibrium utilization). If there is positive discouinting of future utility rates, the long-run iinflation rate exceeds the full-liquidity rate and is greater the larger is the discount rate. From this point of view, therefore, what characterizes the advocates of a "high-pressure" policy of over-utilization is their implicit adoption of a large utility discount. In favouring high utilization today at the cost of high inflation in the eventual future equilibrium, they reveal high "time preference". Dynamical models of this sort are a methodological step forward from the statical approach to optimal aggregate demand discussed at the outset of this article. But it would be premature to base policy on the particular model employed here. Among a host of needed extensions, the following stand out. Inflation should be made to depend upon the change of utilization, as well as the level. Investment should be made endogenous and possibly even optimnized simnultaneously with aggregate demand. And where it is appropriate to assume fixed or only occasionally adjustable exchange rates balance-of-payments considerations should be introduced; from this viewpoint, the model's greatest relevance may be for a nation's optimal objectives in the international co-ordination of aggregate demand and price trends among countries.
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